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The Uncertain Subjects of Anglo-American Financialization 
By Paul Langley (8995) 
 
Introduction: You Have Been McWhortled!  
 
Appearing for the first time four months after the terrorist attacks of 9/ 11, the 
website of McWhortle Enterprises
1
 publicized  the launch of the Bio-Hazard  Alert 
Detector. The Detector, which “is small enough to slip  into a man’s jacket pocket, a 
woman’s purse or child’s backpack,” was the first product offered  by the company 
to “the general public.” Based  upon McWortle’s experience of provid ing “defense 
systems” to the “far-flung executives” of “Fortune 500 companies,” the Detector 
works by sensing “microscopic levels of hazardous bio-organisms and  deadly virus 
organisms.” Owners of a Detector can have considerable “peace of mind,” safe in the 
knowledge that it “emits an audible beep and  flashes when in the presence of all 
known bio-hazards.” The huge potential market for the Detector and  McWhortle’s 
previous success – as evidenced  on its website by customer testimonials and  an 
audio interview with its president Thomas J McWhortle III – led  the company to 
announce an initial public offering (IPO) in a press release of 25
th
 January.
2
 While 
McWhortle’s stated  intention was to file its Registration Statement with the US 
Securities and  Exchange Commission (SEC) five days later in order to enact the IPO, 
the press release also stressed  that “The SEC has advised  us that they have ‘pre -
approved’ our IPO because the nation needs a product like this on the market as 
quickly as possible to protect Americans from terrorism.” Those who responded to 
the press release by trying to invest in McWhortle through the “invest now” section 
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of its website were told  that the IPO was pre-subscribed , but that Stage 2 bidding 
was still available. However, those who passed  through the portal and  attempted  to 
participate in Stage 2 bidding were met with the following message: “If you 
responded to an investment idea like this …You could  get scammed! An investor 
protection message, bought to you by: the Securities and  Exchange Commission.”  
McWhortle Enterprises was one of several hoax investment opportunities 
created  as part of an on-going campaign by the SEC’s Office of Investor Education 
and  Assistance. More recent SEC scam sites include a mutual fund called  “Old  
Glory,” a hedge fund called  “Guaranteed  Returns Diversified , Inc.,” and  an 
investment newsletter called  “Seek to Succeed” that features links to range of 
spurious investment vehicles.
3
 For the savvy investor, there were limited  but highly 
visible clues that ind icated  that McWhortle was a sting – for example, the SEC does 
not “pre-approve” IPOs.  Nevertheless, of the 150,000 visitors to McWhortle’s 
website in the three days following the press release, a good number were 
McWhortled  and  clicked  the “invest now” op tion. By January 30
th
 the SEC admitted  
to the hoax, and  SEC Chairman Harvey L. Pitt explained  that “What we're trying to 
do is warn investors while their guard  is down. The next time, when they encounter 
a real scam, these investors won't let excitement cloud their better judgment.”4  
It is the attempt to produce “better judgment” by existing and  would -be 
investors that lies at the heart of not only McWhortle and  the other SEC scam sites, 
but of a wider set of policies and  initiatives that are currently being undertaken on 
both sides of the Atlantic in the name of “financial literacy” and  “financial 
education.” For existing investors, the SEC also provides, for example, a range of 
brochures and  pamphlets, a toll-free telephone line, ind ividual assistance by email, 
  Langley 3 
and  an interactive website.
5
 New investors are also targeted , whether in terms of 
extending pensions provision,
6
 or perhaps most d isquieting, in terms of initiatives 
undertaken in schools such as the No Child  Left Behind  Act of 2001 and  Jump$tart in  
the US, and  the Personal Finance Education Group’s (PFEG) work in the UK.  
Overall strategic leadership on financial literacy is provided  in the UK by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) which, formed in 2000, enacts statutory duties 
that commit the regulatory body to promote public understanding of the financial 
system. Meanwhile, in the US, December 2004 saw the establishment of the Financial 
Literacy and  Education Commission (FLEC) under the leadership of the Federal 
Reserve. FLEC aims to co-ord inate a national strategy across the relevant arms of 
government. What seems to unite the wide-ranging drive for financial literacy is a 
common commitment to, at once, empower and  d iscipline the individual to take 
responsibility for his or her own financial and  especially investment decisions.  
The humorous but nevertheless illustrative example of McWhortle and  
financial literacy campaigns more broadly draw our attention to the significance of 
the assembly of everyday investor identities in contemporary Anglo-American 
capitalism. The previously settled  thrifty saving practices of making deposits in 
commercial bank accounts and  purchasing government bonds have become 
ruptured . By way of general illustration, 51.9% of US households owned a slice 
(however meager) of the stock market in 2001, up from 25% in 1987 and only 3% at 
the time of the Wall Street Crash.
7
 Through portfolios of equity investments built up 
by applications to privatization schemes, “day trad ing,” and  contributions to mutual 
and pension funds in particular, largely white middle-class individuals and  
households have come to hold  a stake in what post-Keynesian political economists 
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and  neo-Marxist regulation theorists have termed the “financialization” of Anglo -
American capitalism.
8
 “Financialization” is typically analyzed  by neo-liberal 
economists and  institutional political economists in narrow technical and  
economistic terms as a shift in the balance between financial markets and  
corporations. Here it is the fetishes of “shareholder value” and  “good corporate 
governance” - and  associated  corporate practices such as downsizing, contracting 
out, and  share buy-backs - that are held  to mark a change in capitalism.
9
 Yet as 
Froud et al. and  Boyer remind us, the demands made by mutual and  pension funds 
for corporations to increase d ividends and  raise share prices are made in the name of 
the very investors who contribute to the funds.
10
 At the same time, and  alongside 
booming house prices and  low interest rates, the gains made by investors from the 
financialization of the economy serve to power further consumer confidence and  
spending during a period  in which wages are stagnating overall. 
In this paper, I want to explore how we might begin to understand  the 
making of the everyday investors of Anglo-American financialization. What follows 
is d ivided  into three main parts. I begin by briefly comparing the post -Keynesian, 
regulation, Gramscian and  Foucauld ian conceptual pathways currently being 
followed within the existing literature that provide contrasting routes into 
understanding the assembly of everyday investor identities. In d ifferent ways, each 
standpoint tends to cast the subject position of the investor as an identity that is 
performed in a relatively unproblematic fashion. I argue, however, that the 
Foucauld ian-inspired  concept of “governmentality” holds out the potential for 
illuminating the ambiguities and  tensions that vex the making of investor identities, 
but that up to the present point this potential remains largely under -theorized  and  
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unexplored . The second part of the paper asks how investment comes to be 
represented , under the terms of neo-liberal governmentality, as essential to the 
production and  reproduction of individual security and  freedom. I suggest that 
investment appears as a technology of the self under neo-liberal programs of 
government, as d iscourses call up responsible investor subjects who embrace 
financial market risk/ reward  in the face of cu ts in the provision of collective 
insurance. The third  part begins by considering the “investm ent shortfalls” that are 
apparent on both sides of the Atlantic. Such shortfalls against the levels of 
investment that are assumed to be necessary to provide for future security and  
autonomy suggest, in effect, that the subject position of the investor is not simply 
occupied  by individuals in a straightforward  manner. Policy makers have reacted  to 
investment shortfalls with financial literacy campaigns and  initiatives that attempt to 
extend  investment practices to those who are currently excluded. I argue, however, 
that such campaigns and  initiatives cannot overcome contradictions present in the 
processes of identification.  Individuals cannot identify with the subject position of 
the investor to which they are summoned in an unambiguous manner: investment a s 
a technology for the calculating and  embracing of financial market risk/ reward  fails 
to bring order to future uncertainty and  instead  leads to heightened  anxiety; and  the 
performance of investment stands in tension with the practices of work and  
consumption which also appear as essential to securing, advancing and  expressing 
individual freedom in neo-liberal society.  In short, everyday investors are 
necessarily uncertain subjects in Anglo-American financialization. 
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Financialization and Everyday Investors  
 
In the context of a burgeoning literature on the financialization of Anglo-
American capitalism that concerns itself almost exclusively with a transformation in 
the relationships between the financial and  productive economies, post -Keynesian 
political economists and  regulation theorists highlight the importance of everyday 
investment in the processes of change.
11
 From these perspectives, the development 
of everyday investment comes into view as the outcome of largely structural logics. 
Froud et al., for example, “hypothesise two generic types of capitalism: coupon pool 
capitalism and productionism,” and  argue that financialized  or “coupon pool 
capitalism” is “constituted  when … the capital market moves from intermediation to 
regulation of firm and household behaviour.”12 While they are careful to state that 
financialization does not create “a kind  of univocal logic as the power of the capital 
market inevitably overcomes all resistances,” Froud et al. nevertheless argue that 
“the coupon pool has already been constituted  as a regulatory institution” which, it 
appears, operates in somewhat mechanical terms through the potential and  actual 
returns on household  saving.
13
 Not d issimilarly, for Robert Boyer, financialized  
capitalism is imputed  with a coherence that, however unwarranted , necessarily 
follows from a set of assumptions about the transition of capitalism from one 
(Fordist, productionist) growth regime to another (post-Fordist, “finance-led”) 
growth regime.
14
 Once again, the contemporary predominance of finance is taken to 
be an already existing material reality, thereby sidelining important political 
questions as to the contingent processes of financialization in everyday life.  
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In contrast with the work of post-Keynesians and  regulation theorists, some 
Gramscian accounts of the power of Anglo-American finance capital are notable for 
explicitly ascribing analytic importance to the making of investor identities. Adam 
Harmes, for instance, talks of “the emergence of a widespread  ‘investment culture’ 
which … has p layed  a critical role in strengthening the hegemonic dominance of 
finance capital – linking the perceived  interests of tens of millions of workers to its 
own by embedding ‘investor practices’ in their everyday lives.” 15 Despite Harmes 
undoubted  contribution toward  revealing the consensual nature of financialization, 
problems remain with analyses of everyday investment which begin and  end  with 
“finance capital” as their key category for investigation. The social forces of finance 
broadly conceived  (including accountants, auditors, insurers, regulators, lawyers, 
management consultants, information agencies, and  so on) are undeniably making 
substantial profits and  sit atop of the hierarchical networks of financializing 
capitalism. Yet it remains insufficient to understand  the creation of everyday 
investors as simply part and  parcel of the ideological reproduction of the power of a 
clearly definable “finance capital.” As Aitken has it, there is a need  to “underscore 
‘[finance] capital’ not as a macro-structural entity but as something made in the 
spaces of everyday life.”16 Gramscian or other Marxist studies of financialization are 
indeed  strong in situating the growth of everyday investment in the current 
dynamics of capital accumulation, but remain inadequate for an understanding of 
the embodiment and  performance of everyday investment.  
A growing body of research by those working within “cultural economy” is 
also beginning to address the assembly of financial identities.
17
 At present, the 
Foucauld ian-inspired  concept of “governmentality” figures prominently in this 
  Langley 8 
literature.
18
 For Foucault, the concept of governmentality both d istanced  him from 
Marxist theories of ideology and  specifically the work of Althusser, and  provided  a 
means of understanding the operation  of power in (neo)liberal societies. As Foucault 
described  it, governmentality is “the ensemble formed by the institutions, 
procedures, analyses and  reflections, the calculations and  tactics, that allow the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target 
population.”19 What he also calls “the art of government” and  “the conduct of 
conduct” does not simply refer to the institutions, ind ividuals and  groups that hold  
authority over society (e.g. financial capital). Rather, governmentality is a d iscursive 
field  that rationalizes the exercise of power.  Through its practices, specific 
interventions come to connect “government, politics and  administration to the space 
of bodies, lives, selves and  persons.”20 Thus it becomes possible to critically 
scrutinize (neo)liberal programs of government that hinge on the government of the 
self by the self.
21
 On the one hand, (neo)liberal government respects the formal 
freedom and autonomy of subjects. On the other hand, it governs within and  
through those independent actions by promoting the very d isciplinary technologies 
deemed necessary for a successful autonomous life. 
When we consider the existing research into everyday investor subjects that 
deploys the concept of governmentality, what is perhaps most striking are the 
similarities that are ultimately apparent with post-Keynesian, regulation, and  
Gramscian accounts. All, in albeit very d ifferent ways, give the impression that the 
subject position of the investor is performed relatively smoothly as the processes of 
financialization and  neo-liberalization march on. Everyday investors continue to 
appear as artifacts of, and  not architects in, processes of change. As critics of 
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Foucault more broadly have noted , there is a danger that “d isciplina ry power” is 
understood not “as a tendency within modern forms of social control” but as “a fully 
installed  monolithic force which saturates all social relations.” 22 The result, as Stuart 
Hall puts it, is that “d iscursive subject positions become a priori categories which 
ind ividuals seem to occupy in an unproblematic fashion.” 23 While it is perhaps fair 
to level such criticisms at Foucault’s Discipline and  Punish and  the vast array of 
work by social scientists which has followed from it, they can be less easily d irected  
towards his subsequent work on technologies of the self in The History of Sexuality 
and  governmentality. Louise Amoore, for example, is able to draw on the concept of 
governmentality to argue that subjects are both vehicles of d iscourses of d isciplinary 
power and  the means by which those d iscourses are rendered  fragile and  
vulnerable.
24
  
In the remaining parts of the paper, then, I pursue a Foucauld ian approach 
that explicitly does not collapse into the Foucault of Discip line and  Punish and  
thereby reduce everyday investors to “docile bodies.” For us, the concept of 
governmentality suggests that all subjects’ perceived  self-interests as investors are 
d iscursively framed and manifest in their reflective, intentional and  aspirational 
practices, and  that contingency, contradictions, tensions and  ambiguities are also 
likely to be present in the making of investor identities. To return to Stuart Hall, 
“identification is a construction, a process never completed ,” and  we need  to pay 
close “attention to what might in any way interrupt, prevent or d isturb the smooth 
insertion of individuals into … subject positions.”25 Specifically, I inflect the concept 
of governmentality with Foucault’s work on “the cultivation of the self” in The Care 
of the Self, the third  volume of History of Sexuality. Here Foucault explores what he 
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terms the “problematization of aphrodisia” in Rome which was manifest not in “the 
form of a demand for intervention on the part of public authority” but as “an 
intensification of the relation to oneself by which one constituted  oneself as the 
subject of one’s acts.”26 He talks of a series of techniques that permit willing 
individuals to work on an ethics of the self by regulating their bodies, their thoughts 
and conduct. Such “technologies of the self” not only enable d isciplinary self-
improvement and  contribute to the betterment of society, but also make possible 
“the experience of a pleasure that one takes in oneself.” 27 Transposed  to the 
contemporary neo-liberal era in which the ethics of self-improvement privilege the 
material enhancement of ind ividual autonomy and security in the name of a free 
market society, taking care of the self increasingly involves a portfolio of financial 
market assets that, carefully selected  by the individual through the calculated  
engagement with risk, holds out the prospect of pleasure through returns. In short, I 
wish to conceive of investment as a technology of the self under neo-liberal 
governmentality. 
 
Investment as a Neo-Liberal Technology of Self 
 
From the governmentality perspective, the key to understanding the making 
of everyday investor subjects is to reveal the ways in which the practices of 
investment come to be represented  as integral to a secure and  autonomous life. The 
making of everyday investor subjects is, of course, not only a feature of 
contemporary times.
28
 I would  contend, however, that investment occupies a more 
fundamental position in contemporary neo-liberal governmentality than has been 
  Langley 11 
the case previously. It is only in contemporary Anglo-American capitalism that it 
would  seem appropriate to conceive of investment as a neo-liberal technology of the 
self. 
Neo-liberalism can be characterized  as “a political rationality that tries to 
render the social domain economic and  to link a reduction in (welfare) state services 
and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’ and  ‘self-
care’.”29 Contrary to previous liberal programs of government, the neo-liberal state 
plays not only a supervisory role in relation to the market but also stimulates, 
promotes and  shapes subjects who, self-consciously and  responsibly, further their 
own freedom and security through the market in general and  the financial market in 
particular. Processes of identification feature important Others such as those 
“welfare dependents” who, by relying upon the state to provide for them, are mad, 
bad and  in danger of future insecurity. In neo-liberal Anglo-American society the 
result is a “financialization of daily life” that is well underway.30 Not only is it the 
case that financial self-d iscipline (rationality, planning and  foresight, prudence, etc.) 
in general is central for the autonomous neo-liberal subject,
31
 but that investment is 
increasingly becoming essential to the course of self-realization. Practically, this 
means that ind ividuals are encouraged to perceive practices of financial market 
investment and  the returns that are assumed to follow as key to their freedom and 
security for both the medium -term and in their retirement.  
Representations of intimate connections between individual welfare, security 
and  freedom on the one hand, and  the practices of investment on the other, turn, 
then, on the contemporary reworking of risk. Through a critical reading of Frank 
Knight’s classic investigation of indeterm inacy, the category of “risk” can be seen as 
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d istinct from uncertainty, the former as the statistical and  predictive calculation of 
the future and  the latter as non-calculable future volatilities that are beyond rational 
expectations.
32
 Techniques of risk and  actuarialism thus provide a means of 
calculating and  feigning control over a necessarily uncertain future.
33
 It follows that, 
“the responsibilization of the self” associated  with neo-liberal government calls up 
“new forms of prudentialism (a privatized  actuarialism) where risk management is 
forced  back onto individuals and  satisfied  through the market.” 34 Investment is a 
highly significant “private” technology for the ca lculation of risk. The re-articulation 
of risk that is necessary for investment to become closely bound to perceptions of 
enhanced  individual security and  freedom entails, therefore, the d isplacement of 
insurance as a “public” and  collective means of managing risk. 
There are, of course, important similarities between insurance and  investment  
as techniques of risk and  technologies of government. Both hold  out the prospect of 
ind ividual security by constructing the uncertain future as a set of calculable, 
measurable and  manageable risks. Both also rely on expertise, that is, “the social 
authority ascribed  to particular agents” (i.e. insurers, asset managers, etc.) and  
“forms of judgment on the basis of their claims to possess specialized  truths and  rare 
powers” (i.e. probability, actuarialism, portfolio theory, etc.).35 Nevertheless, 
insurance and investment represent “risk” in very d ifferent ways. Insurance 
developed throughout the twentieth century to protect the individual against loss or 
hardship from a d iverse range of risks (e.g. accidents, unemployment, poverty, old  
age, premature death). Here risks are trad itionally constructed  through expert 
probability calculations as an actuarial phenomenon that can be managed, pooled  
and  spread  across a population.
36
 This view of risk as a possible hindrance, danger 
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or loss to be shared  collectively and  therefore minimized  contrasts with the 
representation of risk present in financial market investment practices. Here risk 
appears as an incentive or opportunity to be calculated  and  grasped  by the 
individual. The move from collective insurance to individual investment is, 
therefore, perhaps the exemplar of a broader trend  in neo-liberal society that Baker 
and Simon call “embracing risk.”37 The promise of investment returns makes the 
individualization of responsibility for security and  freedom not just acceptable, but 
welcome and appealing. 
Perhaps the most extreme example of investment as a neo-liberal technology 
of the self at work in Anglo-American financialised  capitalism is found in the US in 
the practices of the so-called  “day trader.” Day traders give u p their day jobs to 
become full-time investors in the financial markets through the channels supplied  by 
internet trad ing platforms and  d iscount brokers. A very small number of individuals 
have, of course, given up their day jobs to compete with the professional financiers. 
Anglo-American mass investment in financial markets is characterized  not so much 
by the rise of the day trader, but by individual portfolios built up through 
contributions to mutual funds (known as unit trusts in the UK) and  pension plan s. 
For example, by the end  of 2002, mutual funds invested  in equities had  come to 
account for 22% of the UK’s £1,900 billion long-term savings. Occupational pensions 
and  personal pension plans which, on average, invest over two-thirds of their capital 
in equities, accounted  respectively for a further 29% and 13% of UK long-term 
savings.
38
  
Investment in mutual funds appears as central to the production of the free 
self under neo-liberal governmentality. Indeed , as the growth of mutual fund 
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investing produces a decline in the share of the US and UK stock markets that are 
owned d irectly by relatively wealthy individuals, mutual funds tend  to be viewed as 
the key development in what some observers call the “democratization of finance.” 39 
Here, and  amidst the d isintegration of collective social forms such as family, welfare 
state and  secure employment, achieving returns from mutual funds is represented  as 
empowering future happiness, improving social standing and , u ltimately, producing 
greater freedom. The proliferation of mutual fund investment has been attributed  by 
some observers to the bull market of the 1990s and  the associated  promises of 
massive returns on investment present in the “new economy” d iscourse.40 The 
pouring of savings into mutual funds, rising stock markets and  (in the US) cuts in 
capital gains taxes were clearly co-constitutive in the new economy,
41
 a relationship 
in which the growth of the financial med ia also undoubtedly played  a very 
important role.
42
 Furthermore, as Frank makes clear, the new economy was in many 
ways the highpoint of the “people’s market of the 1990s,” a period  in which Wall 
Street was represented in the media as much less elitist and  as the domain of Warren 
Buffet and  the middle-class investor.
43
 In our terms, however, understand ing mutual 
fund investors as merely passing moments in everyday financial subjectivity, called  
up by a fleeting d iscourse of financial speculation, is problematic. It serves to 
obscure the moral, political and  technological context in which the subject position of 
the investor is summoned up. If the new economy were the whole story when it 
comes to mutual funds, it would  be fair to expect mutual fund investment to have 
collapsed  with the bursting of the new economy bubble in early 2000. Yet, in January 
2004, American’s poured  $40.8 billion into mutual funds. This was the third  highest 
monthly growth since 1992.
44
 Such growth is perhaps even more revealing given the 
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Enron and  World .com affairs and  the investigations in early 2004, led  by New York 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, into improper trad ing by asset managers at the 
height of the bubble. 
Investment as a technology of the self under neo-liberal governmentality is 
also increasingly at work in Anglo-American pensions. Both states and  employers 
are scaling back insurance commitments that expanded during the post -1945 era, 
thereby individualizing responsibility for provision for old  age. For both the US and 
UK governments, this has entailed  moves to minimize the share of total retirement 
income that is provid ed  through state-based  pension arrangements. These moves 
have included, for example, the indexation of basic state pension benefits to prices as 
opposed  to earnings in the UK, President Bush’s current initiative to partially 
marketize and  individualize US Social Security, and  the provision of various tax 
breaks for private pensions on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. ind ividual retirement 
accounts (IRAs) in the US). For employers, meanwhile, defined -benefit (DB) or “final 
salary” occupational pension schemes have increasingly been closed  to new entrants 
in favor of defined -contribution (DC) or “money purchase” alternatives.45 While the 
scale and  ratio of tax-favored  contributions by employers and  employees varies 
across both DB and DC, it is d ifferences in terms of responsibility and  risk that 
primarily d istinguishes final salary from money purchase schemes. Workers’ 
contributions to DB schemes are invested  in the financial markets on their behalf by 
scheme trustees and  the asset management industry. The employer bears the risk 
returning from investment that may not be sufficient to meet guaranteed  insurance 
benefits which are calculated  according to a prescribed  formula based  on final salary 
and/ or period  of service.  In contrast, under DC plans (which are com monly known 
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as 401(k) plans in the US as around three-quarters of DC plans use the 401(k) tax 
code) no commitment is made on benefits. The individual worker is responsible for 
decid ing the scale of their contributions and  between investment options and , 
ultimately, bears the risk that returns may not be sufficient to provide for their 
retirement income. Achieving a secure and  free retirement in the future increasingly 
requires considerable care of the self in the present, care that it appears can only be 
practiced  through DC plans and  financial market investment. 
 
Uncertain Subjects 
 
The making of everyday investor identities and  the financialization of Anglo-
American capitalism is deeply bound up with neo-liberal governmentality that 
stresses personal responsibility for individual freedom and security. The mass 
middle- classes that are the principal target, collectively and  individually, of neo-
liberal governmentality are not, however, investing sufficiently or effectively in 
order to provide for their security. This is revealed , in effect and  in the most general 
of terms, by the rates of saving that currently prevail on both sides of the Atlantic. 
For example, in the UK, the savings ratio – defined  as household  saving as a 
percentage of gross income – reached  a record  low of 4.8% in the last quarter of 2002. 
This compares to an average of 8.9% over the period  1994-2004.
46
 American 
households, meanwhile, currently save less than 1% of their d isposable income.
47
 
Collective and  individual shortfalls in investment are apparent, more specifically 
and  perhaps most starkly, in terms of investing for retirement. The initial report by 
the Pensions Commission suggests that 13 million of the UK’s 28 million working 
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population are not saving at a level sufficient to provide for a financially secure 
retirement.
48
 Munnell and  Sundén’s work for the Brookings Institution on 401(k) 
plans paints a similar picture.
49
 Furthermore, Munnell and  Sundén also suggest that 
401(k) plan participants largely fail to undertake the portfolio d iv ersification 
strategies that basic investment theory deems necessary to the management of 
investment risk. Indeed , the hold ing of “unbalanced” portfolios was cruelly exposed  
by the fate of the Enron workers who lost not only their jobs, but also roughly ha lf of 
their retirement savings which had  been invested  in the stock of their employer.
50
 
Current shortfalls in collective and  individual investment, and  the presence of 
practices that d iverge significantly from the basics of investment theory, suggest that 
the making of everyday investor subjects is proceeding far from smoothly. The 
principal response of policy makers and  the finance industry on both sides of the 
Atlantic has been to step up the promotion of so-called  “financial education” and  
“financial literacy” as d iscussed  in the introduction to this paper. Specific policy and  
regulatory initiatives are also in play that seek to broaden investment practices to 
include those who are currently marginalized. For example, President Bush’s 
proposed  reform of Social Security would  create millions of first-time financial 
market investors in a so-called  “ownership society.” Meanwhile, in the UK, the 
center-piece of current pensions policy is the “stakeholder pension” that is designed  
to reach out to those five to eight million low/ middle-income ind ividuals that are 
not currently saving for their own retirement.  
While the promotion of financial literacy and  the extension of financial market 
investment to those who are presently excluded may be laudable in its own t erms, 
these policies necessarily miss the point when it comes to the making of investors. 
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Neo-liberal programs represent the investor as a clearly demarcated  and  
unproblematic subject position that can be performed by rational, calculative and  
financially-literate individuals to further their own security and  freedom. Yet as 
Miller and  Rose stress, (neo)liberal programs of government are typically contingent, 
contested  and  contradictory.
51
 It follows that, contrary to post-Keynesian, Gramscian 
and  existing Foucauld ian readings in particular, the embodiment of the mass 
investment culture of financialization is likely to be highly problematic. Specifically, 
drawing on Foucault’s theorization of the concept of governmentality, I want to 
argue that two principal contradictions interrupt the processes of identification in 
everyday investment.  Caught amidst these contradictions, ind ividuals cannot 
identify with the subject position of the investor to which they are summoned in an 
unambiguous manner and , therefore, negotiate and  contest d isciplinary power 
relations in important ways.   
The first contradiction that interrupts the assembly of investor identities arises 
out of the place of risk in the operation of investment as a technology of the self 
under neo-liberal governmentality. The prospects for ind ividual security and  
freedom that are held  out as possible through investment as care of the self hinge on 
the returns that are assumed to follow from embracing financial market risk. The 
financial future is cast as an opportunity that can be taken by the investor who 
appropriately calculates, measures and  manages risk. Yet the proposed  calculative 
engagement with risk/ reward  assumes that it is indeed  possible to bring some 
semblance of order to the necessarily uncertain future.  It becomes apparent, based  
on our critical reading of Frank Knight’s work on indeterminacy, that this is not a 
possibility. Consider, by way of illustration, DC pension plans and  annuities. 
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Investment as a technique of risk emphasizes that contributions to a DC scheme 
should  be held  in a balanced  and  d iversified  portfolio of assets. But, at retirement, 
DC schemes tend  to require that the individual surrenders or “cashes out” this 
balanced  portfolio in favor of a single financial instrument – i.e. an annuity that will 
pay an income over the years until death. Given that annuity rates are closely tied  to 
prevailing interest rates and  thus fluctuate considerably, retirement investors are 
thus exposed  to uncertainties that arise from not being able to calculate the interest 
rate at the time of their retirement. The retirement income of those who retired  in the 
late 1990s is, for example, considerably higher than that of those who are retiring at 
present in a period  in which annuity rates (like interest rates) have hit historic lows. 
What is plain is that the fate of even those individuals who have responsibly and  
skillfully invested  for their freedom and security in retirement is simply determined 
by luck and  good or bad  timing. 
Unable to bring order to the necessarily uncertain future, investment, to 
paraphrase from Crook, actually results in the “overproduction and undercontrol of 
risks.”52 The investor subject’s attempts to calculate, measure and  manage 
proliferating risks are increasingly strained  by volatilities that cannot be captured  
and governed  by rational expectations. “A general information overload” and  
“anxiety and  insecurity [rather] than a sense of safety and  control” follow from “the 
arbitrariness and  necessary incompleteness of even the m ost assiduous individual 
risk calculation.”53 The continual representation of investment as a principal means 
of acquiring material well-being, security and  freedom only serves to heighten this 
anxiety and , ultimately, to install a sense of perpetual crisis. For some, anxiety and  
uncertainty manifests itself in a retreat to the relative safety of savings accounts 
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where returns are guaranteed , but more likely is a rejection of saving and  financial 
market investment all together. Framed by the explanations of market failure offered  
by institutional economics,
54
 recent evaluative reports in the UK in particular tend  to 
represent this as a “lack of trust” or “loss of confidence” in investment. The House of 
Commons Treasury Committee, for example, begins from the assumption that there 
is currently “a damaging lack of consumer confidence in long -term saving.”55 While 
the Committee recognizes that the collapse of the new economy bull market 
undermined confidence in investment in broad  terms, it holds that “the fundamen tal 
issue was that the industry had  a poor record  for treating customers fairly.” 56 In our 
terms, the report suggests that investment as a technique of risk is in no way 
contradictory. Instead , incidences of failure at which the risk/ uncertainty 
contradiction surfaces are cast as the consequence of either miss-selling and  miss-
information, or unrealistic expectations over the likely performance particular 
products.  
At the same time that anxiety and  uncertainty come to manifest themselves in 
the rejection of financial market investment, some individuals have come to perceive 
their self-interests to be best served  by pushing back the frontiers of what it means to 
be “an investor.” Put d ifferently, investment as a technology of the self does not take 
the form envisaged  under neo-liberal governmentality. Indications are that large 
numbers of investors have turned  their backs on the financial markets in favor of 
residential property. A survey undertaken by the Association of British Insurers 
suggests, for example, that 32% of the UK population plan to use income from their 
property to fund retirement, with 13% expecting their property to provide their main 
source of income in retirement.
57
 Indeed , the era of rapid ly rising house prices since 
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the latter half of the 1990s has seen the emergence of so-called  “flippers” and  “buy-
to-let investors” on both sides of the Atlantic. “Flippers” are owner -occupiers who, 
by moving house or “flipping” at regular intervals in a rising market, have treated  
their home as an investmen t and  gained  significantly or “traded  up” on the 
“property ladder.” The burgeoning popular finance and  property media regularly 
features advice on how to become a flipper, often in conjunction with 
recommendations on “home improvement” and  “do-it-yourself” trends that will add  
value to your home.
58
 Meanwhile, the value of outstanding buy-to-let mortgages in 
the UK rose from £2 billion at the end  of 1998 to £47 billion by June 2004.
59
 
According to the National Association of Realtors, a staggering 23% of all h ouse 
purchases in the US in 2004 were made for investment purposes and  not for owner 
occupation.
60
 What is especially notable here is the way that buy-to-let property 
investors, in effect, lever their investments through mortgage borrowing and  are 
reliant upon the rental payments of their tenants. 
In addition to the contradiction manifest in investment as a technique of risk, 
a second contradiction also intervenes in processes of identification such that 
ind ividuals do not simply perform the subject position  of the financial market 
investor. The subject position of the investor that is summoned up in neo-liberal 
governmentality is represented  as a paradoxically monolithic and  d isconnected  
economic identity. Indeed , it is the very isolation of the “the investor” that provides 
the anchor point in representations of close relationships between the financial 
markets on the one hand and  individual freedom and security on the other. Such 
isolation, of course, cannot hold , as investors are also simultaneously workers  and  
consumers. Just as it is impossible to unambiguously d istinguish responsible 
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investors from irresponsible welfare dependents, so investors cannot be clearly 
demarcated  from the subject positions of workers and  consumers. I want to stress, 
then, that the performance of investment stands in tension with the practices of work 
and  consumption which also appear as essential to securing, advancing and  
expressing individual freedom in neo-liberal society. 
Alongside the investor subject, neo-liberal governmentality also calls up the 
“worker-entrepreneur” in the contemporary restructuring of the productive 
economy.
61
 Both the investor and  the worker-entrepreneur tend  to be represented  as 
responsible and  self-reliant figures who embrace risk/ reward . The financial markets 
and  flexible, downsized , mobile and  contacted -out production appear to present 
opportunities for ind ividuals who want to progress. Here the successful worker -
entrepreneur who builds their “career portfolio” will have no problems, for example, 
in also contributing to and  managing their own DC pension or mutual fund. 
However, worker-entrepreneurs necessarily confront new uncertainties over 
employment contracts, hours, pay and  conditions that, obscured  by d iscourses of 
risk/ reward , are likely to undercut their capacity to perform the subject position of 
the investor. The responsible investor who builds a portfolio of securities in order to 
provide for his or her future requires a d isposable income to invest. Investment is 
not a one off event, but a set of on-going calculative practices of self care that rely, 
for the vast majority of the middle classes at least, on relatively predictable wages. 
Amongst pension economists, this is sometimes referred  to as the “life cycle 
hypothesis of saving and  wealth accumulation,” whereby members of households 
invest in assets during their working lives which they later rely upon for income. Far 
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from enabling investor subjects, contemporary restructuring in production and  work 
introduces additional uncertainties into everyday investment practices. 
Furthermore, what is particularly ironic is that mass investment and  the 
associated  drive for so-called  “shareholder value” in the name of the investor and  
financial market efficiency contributes towards uncertainties over employment. Put 
starkly and  in the words of Leo W. Gerard , International President of the United  
Steel Workers of America, “financial markets are cutting our throats with our own 
money.”62 This has been the message for organized  labor since the late 1970s,63 a 
message that has been taken forward  by many of the labor activists who became the 
“shareholder activists” of multi-employer and  public pension schemes such as 
CalPERS in the 1990s. The key challenge for these activists remains converting 
workers’ investments in corporate securities into greater control over management 
practices, thereby advancing “a new paradigm” for pension fund investment that 
takes into account “the interests of all stake-holders in the economy in equal 
measure.”64 Yet as Marens concludes, shareholder activism in the name of workers 
as “stakeholders” has, to date, served  primarily to further so -called  “good corporate 
governance.”65 This actually further erodes the capacities of corporate managers to 
undertake strategies that deviate from production patterns that are flexible, lean, and  
out-sourced . In short, even with the advent of shareholder activism, what we gain as 
workers, we lose as investors and  visa-versa, and  the performance of investment 
continues to stand  in tension with the practices of work. 
In addition to the investor subject and  the worker -entrepreneur, neo-liberal 
governmentality also calls up consumer subjects who express and  communicate 
their freedom, aspirations and  individuality through commodity ownership and  acts 
  Langley 24 
of consumer choice.
66
 Consumer credit has come to play an increasingly central role 
in the practices of consumer subjects, wiping away the need  to earn and/ or save 
before a purchase can be made. Indeed , the consumption of consumer credit has 
itself become an important means of expression. Consider, for instance, the “gold  
card” (or, more recently, the American Express Centurion “black card”) as a symbol 
of wealth and  standing, and  so-called  “affinity cards,” that is, “personalized” credit 
cards adorned  with the symbols of sports clubs, charities, and  even celebrities such 
as Elvis Presley.
67
 What is significant for us, however, is that contrary to the popular 
d iscourses that bemoan the growth of consumer credit as a collapse in the values of 
thrift, the practices of consuming on credit are “d isciplined  hedonism.”68 With self-
indulgence and  profligacy necessarily come financial self-d iscipline and  repayments 
on personal loans and  credit card  bills that must be met in order that credit scores 
are maintained  and  that “freedom and individuality” can continue to be expressed  
in the future. There is, then, a contradiction between the consumer and  investor as 
subject positions in neo-liberal governmentality. Even the most d isciplined  and  
calculative individual of typical means will, for example, struggle to simultaneously 
reconcile borrowing for house, car and  consumer goods purchases on the one hand, 
with contributing to a mutual fund and  participating in a 401(k) plan on the other.  It 
is no coincidence, then, that the formation of investor subjects is proving particularly 
problematic at a time when individuals continue to take part in a frenzied  borrowing 
binge. 
Official reports on investment shortfalls in the US and UK do not stress the 
tensions that are present between the p erformance of investment on the one hand 
and  consumption on the other. There is, of course, also no mention of the 
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uncertainties and  insecurities experienced  by worker -entrepreneurs. Interestingly, 
however, the problems of reconciling investment and  credit -fuelled  consumption are 
more often than not laid  bare in guides to investment produced by government.  
Here outstanding obligations arising from consumer credit relations tend  to appear 
as the first enemy of the investor. For example, the Department of Labor’s principal 
pensions guide features a section on how to “Boost Your Financial Performance.” 69 
Readers are told  that “There’s one simple trick for saving for any goal: spend less 
than you earn.” The following section instructs readers to “Avoid  Debt and  Credit 
Problems,” and  tells them that “High debt and  misuse of credit cards make it tough 
to save for retirement.” Further “additional tips for handling credit cards wisely” 
include “Keep only one or two cards, not the usual eight or nine,” “Pay off the ca rd  
each month, or at least pay more than the minimum,” and  “Leave the cards at home 
or cut them up!” 
 
Concluding Remarks: Re-politicizing Financialization 
 
Drawing attention to the contradictions present in the assembly of investor subjects 
is particularly important if we are to go beyond policy evaluation and  technical 
solutions and  begin to genuinely re-politicize the financialization of Anglo-American 
capitalism. Neo-liberal programs currently serve to silence political debate by 
presenting future economic security as a technical problem to be solved  by the 
individual who calculates, embraces and  bears financial market risk through their 
investment practices. It is important to stress, however, that the theorization of 
governmentality and  subsequent analysis offered  here also provide a particular 
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route to politicizing financialization in general and  everyday investment in 
particular.  
Take, by way of illustration, the practices of so-called  “ethical investment” 
that would  seem to provide an important strategy for intervening politically in the 
financialization of economic life. Ethical investors draw on the legacy of many civic 
associations, most notably churches and  universities, that have sought for centuries 
to avoid  investment in, for instance, the prod uction of alcohol. An ethical investor 
will typically choose from a menu of mutual or pension funds that have been 
“screened” and  branded according to various “positive” or “negative” criteria.  
Positive screening enables investment in companies that, for example, are involved  
in recycling and  conservation, and  negative screening leads to the avoidance of 
companies linked , for example, to the arms trade. Stock market ind ices such as 
FTSE4Good provide, meanwhile, a touchstone and  benchmark for the performance 
of ethical investments. Ethical investment practices may indeed  contest the 
assumption that collective principles are necessarily sacrificed  in order to make a 
profit – there is little evidence that ethical investments under -perform relative to the 
market in general. Yet from the perspective taken here, ethical investment does not 
question the neo-liberal representation of practices of investment as integral to a 
secure and  autonomous life, but adds moral bells and  whistles to investment as a 
vehicle of self-care and  collective gain. 
More broadly, the post-Keynesian and  neo-Marxist accounts of 
financialization d iscussed  in the first part of this paper come to be seen from a 
governmentality perspective as falling foul of what Gibson -Graham call 
“capitalocentrism.”70 This manifests itself in two major problems. First, while 
  Langley 27 
d isagreeing with neo-liberal representations of the moral virtues and  social 
consequences of financialization, existing critical accounts tend  to hold  in common 
with neo-liberalism the assumption that financialization is a dynamic, powerful, 
mobilizing, penetrating force which is everywhere, driving societal and  historical 
change. Individual investors are therefore portrayed  as largely passive dupes who 
act at the behest of new financial imp eratives and/ or the financial fraction of capital. 
The result is that the partial, fragmented  and  d iscontinuous features of the 
financialization of capitalism are, at best, overlooked and , at worst, regarded  as a 
temporary blip  that will be ironed  out as the logic and  power of finance is furthered . 
Second, post-Keynesian and  neo-Marxist accounts prompt forms of politics that 
clearly and  unequivocally refute financialization. This repudiation is advanced  in the 
name of the workers who lose out as financial capital and  financial imperatives 
triumph, and  often seeks to make workers conscious that mass investment is not in 
their interest. Such politics can be seen, for example, in the shareholder activism of 
those US trade unionists who have sought to assert greater control over the 
investment decisions of multi-employer and  public pension funds. However, as I 
have argued elsewhere, proponents of change tend  not to acknowledge the 
problematic character of attempts to define what those on the Left broadly conceived  
should  oppose - such as financialization of capitalism.
71
 Furthermore, and  to 
paraphrase from Louise Amoore, the lack of contingency present in attempts to say a 
clear “no” to financialization necessarily shuts down consideration of the plurality of 
multiple resistances already taking place.
72
 It is not simply the case that ind ividuals 
can and  should  reject the subject position of the investor that is complicit within 
financialization in favor of the unified  and  rad icalized  working-class subject. Rather, 
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politicizing financialization precisely requires that we recognize the incomplete and  
partial nature of investor identities as integral to our consideration of the potential 
spaces for d issent. 
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